00:21:01 Jessica Tillipman: Sound seems a little better now. Hopefully that is the case for everyone. 00:23:09 Christopher Yukins: Thanks -- I will work on the sound from here. 00:24:44 Christopher Yukins: The in-depth assessment that Jessica Tillipman and I posted through the program site at www.publicprocurementinternational.com includes a detailed legislative history for the 1978 Inspector General Act and the 2008 reforms she is discussing. 00:30:18 Lisa Rein: Oversight.gov for gov't wide IG reports! 00:33:50 Craig Barrett: Without a "For Cause Removal Clause" are we deceiving ourselves to think that there can ever be true "independence" with our IGs when in essence they are hired and (could be) fired by the President who might be dissatisfied with negative investigation over one of his/her agencies. 00:36:52 Jessica Tillipman: Per Craig Barrett’s question - Noah will be discussing some proposals for reform that could enhance independence - including a “for cause” removal legislative fix 00:37:15 Christopher Yukins: An audience member has asked whether a forced administrative leave constitutes a removal. Clark Ervin, in his book "Open Target" (available on Amazon), talks about the enormous pressures on IG's to be able to speak publicly for their office, through congressional testimony, etc. A forced administrative leave would effectively decapitate the IG's office. 00:40:00 Kevin Mulshine: When a new IG takes office, what flexibility does s/he have to appoint her/his own team and release “inherited” staff selected by a predecessor? 00:40:15 Christopher Yukins: We received the following question: In the matter of President Trump removing Steve Linick as the IG for Department of State: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has stated publicly that he recommended to the President that Steve Linick be fired. President Trump has stated that he did not know Steve Linick and had never met him. How can the President claim he lost confidence in Linick if he did not know him and apparently took the word of the Secretary of State, who this IG had oversight of? ANSWER: Jessica Tillipman and I discussed this in our in-depth summary. The problem is the DC Circuit decision (relied upon extensively by White House counsel Pat Cipollone in his recent response to Congress regarding Mr. Linick) which said that it is enough that the President "loses confidence," without more. That means, in practice, that Congress must have an opportunity to engage the administration during the 30-day period before removal. 00:41:31 Christopher Yukins: To Kevin Mulshine's question -- in his book "Open Target," Clark Ervin discussed how he staffed the IG's offices at State and the Department of Homeland Security, when he headed those. 00:50:38 Christopher Yukins: We received a really interesting question on the Q&A -- would placing the inspectors general in the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an arm of Congress, make them more effective? As our in-depth analysis on publicprocurementinternational.com points out, putting the function back into GAO would be moving history in reverse -- this "comptroller" and audit function was moved out of GAO after World War II because, with the growth of the federal government, GAO could not handle the vast audit and investigation task. Thus the decision to move the function into the agencies, out of GAO. 00:51:43 Jessica Tillipman: To add to Chris’s point, it may help for removal purposes, but they may have less access to information. There have been numerous instances where the current administration has refused to cooperate in GAO audits. 00:52:11 Christopher Yukins: Per a question in the Q&A -- the recording will be available on YouTube and through the program site on publicprocurementinternational.com. The YouTube recording will have captioning available in 100+ languages. 00:54:03 Jessica Tillipman: An IG is not part of the DOJ, though they often make referrals to the DOJ 00:54:16 Jessica Tillipman: DOJ actually has its own IG. 00:54:43 Robert Anderson: Could there be an optimal compromise situation - the IGs would be legally housed in (and protected by) GAO but deployed to the relevant agencies on a continuing basis? 00:54:58 Jessica Tillipman: Here is one: https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2017/11/trump-officials-rebuff-gao-auditors/142185/ 00:56:16 Jessica Tillipman: Here is another: https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/democrats-request-hearing-on-white-house-obstruction-of-gao-investigations 00:56:58 Christopher Yukins: To Rob Anderson's question -- moving the function to GAO would help insulate the function, but would divorce the function from the systems improvements that are an inherent part of the IG's job inside the agencies. Clark Ervin's book talks about the systems improvements that his staff focused on (for example, in information technology systems at State). GAO, as an arm of Congress, can only make recommendations constitutionally; thus, GAO is always more removed than the IG's resident in the agencies. 01:02:40 Christopher Yukins: To Elizabeth Pullin's question -- whether it's possible to "merge" the IG function between the legislative and executive branches. That's the question that Noah will be discussing -- the CFPB case pending before the Supreme Court asks whether Congress may restrain the President's power to remove executive officers by imposing a requirement that those officers be removed only "for cause." This is the separation-of-powers issue at the heart of your question, Elizabeth, and it means that the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB) decision will be pivotal to reform in this area. 01:03:00 Lisa Rein: IGs refer potential criminal cases to the Justice Dept.. IGs refer potential criminal cases to the Justice Dept. That's where they come in 01:03:01 Christopher Yukins: Sorry -- Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 01:05:07 Lisa Rein: Harriet, that's a key question. In theory, no, a new IG should NOT kill an ongoing investigation. And that's been the case many times. But here, we don't know 01:05:45 Lisa Rein: A new IG is not obligated to continue an ongoing probe, but my sense is that the probe could/would get fewer resources, less priority, etc 01:06:02 Christopher Yukins: The CFPB case at the Supreme Court is key -- it may be an opportunity for a more conservative Court to declare that a the head of a "unitary Executive" (President) may not be constrained in his power over his own officers. 01:06:50 Craig Barrett: Doesn't this just prove that there may be an over reliance and dependence on our public officials adhering to norms rather than there being legislation clearly limiting executive power (thus avoiding abuses of power)? 01:07:04 Jessica Tillipman: Craig - yes! 01:07:19 Craig Barrett: I am very sad right. 01:07:34 Craig Barrett: now 01:07:35 Lisa Rein: I don't think the frames of the 1978 IG law anticipated a Donald Trump presidency :)-- 01:07:35 Jessica Tillipman: The job of the next administration (whenever that is) will be to codify the norms 01:08:03 Kevin Mulshine: I took over an IG office that, rather than audit/investigate contracting activities, chose to serve as HR police. in that case, a new IG should be able to re-direct the focus of the office and get away from questions regarding hiring decisions. 01:09:17 Lisa Rein: Kevin, understand. IGs have such broad latitude. 01:09:31 Christopher Yukins: I was struck by Steve Linick's 2018 video, which is available on YouTube.com and featured in the in-depth assessment at publicprocurementinternational.com. He clearly expressed his sense of purpose and independence, both for himself and his staff, and for other stakeholders. 01:15:15 abidi taoufik: the IG has a right of self-seizure without mission order