GW Law Webinar: U.S. Bid Protests — Progress and Reform

September 9, 2025

Program Slides – Chat – Transcript from Recording

On September 9, 2025 GW Law School’s Government Procurement Law program hosted a free one-hour webinar on potential reforms to U.S. government bid protests. Our panelists discuss the en banc decision in Percipient.ai from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a key report on bid protests by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, revealing data on bid protests gathered by the ABA Public Contract Law Section, and a wide range of reform proposals being debated before Congress.  

Panelists

Topics for Panel Discussion

In assessing potential bid protest reforms, the panel will discuss the following during the upcoming webinar: (1) the GAO response to Section 885 of the FY2025 NDAA (a portion of the discussion which Ken Patton will lead); (2) potential bid protest reforms (Judge Marion Horn, Dana Chase, Scott Flesch and Chris Yukins); (3) the decision in Percipient.ai (Bryan Goldberg). Each of those topics is summarized below.

GAO “Section 885” Report

In a July 14, 2025 report, GAO responded to “mandates” put by Congress in Section 885 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2025.

Enhanced Pleading Standard: First, Congress called for GAO to submit a proposal for an “enhanced” pleading standards when a protester seeks access to Defense Department records. GAO has responded by enhancing its pleading standard “to make it clearer that protest allegations must be credible and supported by evidence.” In its Aug. 5, 2025 decision in Warfighter Focused Logistics, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-423546 & B423546.2, GAO explained: “In order to make it clear that only protests meeting the standards of legal and factual sufficiency will survive dismissal, we proposed to replace our existing formulation with a requirement that protesters must provide, at a minimum, credible allegations that are supported by evidence and are sufficient, if uncontradicted, to establish the likelihood of the protester’s claim of improper agency action. . . . We adopt this formulation of our pleading standard here and in future decisions.” Id. note 3.

Recovering Costs and Lost Awardee Profits: Congress also called for GAO to submit a proposal that included benchmarks for the following categories of costs: (1) average costs to DOD and GAO of a covered protest based on the value of the contract that is the subject of the covered protest; and (2) the lost profits of the awardee contractor when a protest has been filed after award. In response, GAO reported that insufficient data were available ” concerning DOD’s protest costs and contractor lost profit rates to calculate reliable benchmarks.” As an alternative, GAO said that “Congress may consider requiring, by statute, DOD to track its protest-related costs as well as contractor profit or fee information.” GAO cautioned, however, that in “responding to a draft of this proposal DOD indicated that, in their view, the cost and administrative burden this data collection would require outweigh the benefits.” GAO pointed out that “DOD protests at GAO have declined 48 percent over the last 10 years and less than 2 percent of procurements are protested, and DOD’s view is that there is not a need for cost collection and the challenges associated with such a requirement.”

“Loser Pays”: Congress finally asked GAO to propose a process by which an unsuccessful protester would pay the government and the successful contractor — a “loser pays” mechanism. In response, GAO reported that DOD “does not capture data to develop benchmarks to support a process to recoup costs from unsuccessful protesters.” GAO notably did not endorse creating a fee shifting process for bid protests because (in GAO’s view) existing statutory authorities and bid protest procedures are sufficient to resolve and limit the adverse impacts of meritless protests.

GAO nevertheless developed two alternatives for congressional consideration.

First, GAO noted, “Congress might consider a focused statutory requirement for DOD to include a contract provision that would permit DOD to recoup — or otherwise withhold — profit or fee where an incumbent contractor files a protest that is subsequently dismissed as legally or factually insufficient or for otherwise being procedurally infirm.” GAO also pointed out, though, that in “responding to a draft of this proposal, DOD noted that, in its view, the costs of such a process would outweigh the benefits, and such a provision could negatively impact competition if contractors decide not to bid due to the requirement.”

Second, GAO wrote, “Congress might consider authorizing GAO to require a protester whose protest is dismissed as legally or factually insufficient or for otherwise being procedurally infirm to reimburse DOD for the costs incurred in handling the protest, as well as any lost profits incurred by the awardee whose contract was stayed during the pendency of the protest.” For now, however, GAO reiterated that “such an approach is currently impractical given the lack of data about protest costs,” and implementing this “loser-pays” approach “would require material statutory and administrative changes.”

Reform Proposals Under Consideration

Below, some of the leading pending proposals for reform are reviewed; they are discussed in more detail in the “Feature Comment” article linked at right. The reform proposals are assessed against the two core risk-reducing purposes of bid protests: (1) to reassure competitors that they will be treated fairly, and so to ensure robust competition in public procurement markets; and (2) to bring to light failures in the procurement system. During the webinar, panelists Judge Horn, Dana Chase and Scott Flesch, with moderator Chris Yukins, will review these reform proposals. A second “Feature Comment” article, assessing the Percipient.ai en banc decision, enhanced debriefings and agency-level protests, is discussed below.

“Two-Bite” Protests

Some complain that allowing protesters to protest first at GAO, then (if unsuccessful) at the Court of Federal Claims (COFC), causes delay and unnecessary costs. Others, though, argue that “two-bite” protests ensure an adequate record.

Protests by Incumbents

Critics have complained that incumbent protesters file weak protests only in order to be awarded temporary bridge contracts—and thus extend their revenue streams— while the protest is pending. To discourage these protests, a pending provision in the House of Representatives would force protesting incumbents to forfeit any profits they earned during the period of protest if they lost the “stalling” protest. But “incumbent protests” may not be as serious as some claim. Protests are expensive for incumbents too, and the bridge contract need not be awarded to the incumbent. Moreover, incumbents are sometimes the best protesters.

The Trump administration’s “Revolutionary FAR Overhaul” (RFO), discussed further below, stresses that incumbents should not be able to use protests “to delay contract transition.” The proposed RFO text for Part 33 would not, however, specially target protests by incumbents.

A final piece of the puzzle is legislative. Section 818 of the House version of the pending National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 3838, would call for contracting officers to file a contract claim for disgorgement of profits if an incumbent filed a GAO protest that was dismissed because by final decision “based [on] a lack of any reasonable legal or factual basis.” The House report which accompanies the bill notes that Section 818 “would require the Secretary of Defense . . . to revise the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to establish procedures for a contracting officer to seek disgorgement of certain profits or fees earned by the incumbent contractor if the incumbent filed a bid protest with the Comptroller General of the United States; continued performance on the contract while the protest was pending; and the bid protest was subsequently dismissed because of a lack of reasonable legal or factual basis.” The report notes that Section 818 also would amend 31 USC 3553 (which governs GAO bid protests) to “authorize the head of a [DoD] procuring activity of the Department of Defense to override the stay in the award of a contract during the period of protest if doing so would facilitate the national defense.” The legislation was reported out of the House Armed Services Committee in July 2025.

Meritless Protests

Critics have also complained that vendors may file meritless protests that result in delays and costs for agencies. But both GAO and the COFC have extensive procedural tools at hand to dispose of meritless protests. And if a vendor obnoxiously submits a series of frivolous and vexatious protests, it faces a risk of being considered non-responsible (of being excluded from future procurements), see FAR 9.104-1, or receiving poor performance evaluations, see FAR 42.1501. There is also a hidden risk here: by barring vendors which protest often from future awards, agencies could inadvertently damage their supply chains.

Bonding

Some critics have argued that filing a protest is inexpensive for contractors but may lead to disruption and delays for agencies. They have argued that protesters therefore should be required to file a monetary bond with their protests. But although COFC Rule 65 already contemplates a possible bond when a protester seeks an injunction pending the protest, and Appendix C, paragraph 15 of the Court’s rules raises the possibility of a bond requirement, in fact bonds are rarely required by the Court. See generally Nathaniel E. Castellano & Sierra A. Paskins, Preliminary Injunction Bonds: An Emerging Bid Protest Issue, 39 Nash & Cibinic Rep. 14 (Mar. 2025).

Although (as noted) bonds are rarely required in COFC bid protests, in a series of decisions the judges of the COFC have clarified the COFC Rule 65(c) mandate (which echoes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)) that a bond be provided if a preliminary injunction is to be entered.  

In IgniteAction JV, LLC v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 62 (2024), the COFC’s Judge Bruggink noted that generally “the amount of a bond is ‘within the sound discretion of a trial court.’” Id. at 73 (citing Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). He emphasized that the court’s discretion “includes ‘”dispens[ing] with the bond requirement where there has been no proof of likelihood of harm” to those enjoined.’” Id. (citing LEGO A/S v. ZURU Inc., 799 F. App’x 823, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Corning Inc. v. PicVue Elecs., Ltd., 365 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2004))). This means that “the court will not require a bond amount where the enjoined party’s claimed damages are remote or speculative.” Id. (citing CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Custom Optical Frames, Inc., 1996 WL 338388, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 1996)).

A number of COFC decisions have turned on this requirement that the government’s demand for a bond pending a bid protest be backed by a sound explanation of prospective damages. See, e.g., Peraton Inc. v. United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 59, 71 (2019); Bona Fide Conglomerate, Inc. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 233, 243 (2010) (bond ordered based upon awardee’s standby costs and agency’s administrative costs during delay caused by protest); Hosp. Klean of Tex, Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 618, 624 (2005) (bond based on increased bridge contract costs and termination costs owed awardee).

In IgniteAction, however, Judge Bruggink found the government’s estimate of damages “speculative” because the government assumed that its only (and more expensive) option was to issue another bridge contract to the incumbent. See also Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 355, 360 (2018) (no bond required because no additional damages since prospective period of injunction already covered by contract option). But cf. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 146, 159 (2020) (imposing bond requirement because “some degree of uncertainty or speculation is inherent in [the government’s] attempt to quantify the harm it may suffer as a result of the preliminary injunction,” and  noting protester’s failure to provide alternative calculations).

Other decisions, in contrast, seem to have assumed that a bond must be provided under Rule 65(c) for a preliminary injunction to be issued. See, e.g., Myriddian, LLC v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 650 (2023); Serco, Inc. v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 717 (2011) (bond required per government’s “speculative” estimate of cost of performance during two weeks of performance); Bilfinger Berger AG Sede Secondaria Italiana v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 389, 393 (2010); Datapath, Inc. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 616 (2009); Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, No. 08-133 C, 2008 WL 4725410 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 31, 2008); Advanced Sys. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 474, 487 (2006) ($1,000 bond ordered, without stated rationale); Aeroplate Corp. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 1, 1 (2005) ($2,000 bond, no rationale).

While the language of Rule 65(c) (“The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”) supports the reading that a bond is always needed, many decisions (see above) have said that the bond requirement may be erased, in essence, if the court concludes that the government is at fault for the delay, see RhinoCorps Co. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 673, 680 (2009), or the government’s projected damages are too speculative or the requested bond is otherwise excessive or unwarranted, see, e.g., ACTA, LLC v. United States, No. 20-356C, 2020 WL 2065976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 24, 2020)  (“As [protester] has persuaded the Court that it is not only likely to succeed on the merits but has succeeded on two arguments, on the basis of the administrative record, the Court determines, pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), that the proper amount of security in this case is $0.00.”); Metters Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 444, 450 (2013) (same); MORI Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 503 (2011) (same); University Research Co., LLC v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 500, 515 (2005) (same); Watts-Healy Tibbitts A JV v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 614, 619 (“Plaintiff shall post a bond, with a surety authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury in the amount of $1.00.” ), modified on other grounds sub nom. Watts-Healy Tibbitts AJV v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 603 (2008); EOD Tech., Inc. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 12, 22 (2008); BCPeabody Constr. Servs., Inc. v. United States, No. 13-378C, 2013 WL 3225844, at *2 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 2013) (finding the estimated costs of delay during the pending protest “greatly overstated” because the estimate failed to take into account the awardee’s obligation under the Protest After Award Clause, FAR 52.233-3, to “to take all reasonable steps to minimize the incurrence of costs upon a post-award bid protest”).

Notably, new impetus for a bonding requirement may be coming from President Trump’s March 2025 memorandum directing agencies to ask that courts require a bond where (as in bid protests) the opposing party seeks injunctive relief against the Government. The memorandum states that in “recent weeks, activist organizations . . . have obtained sweeping injunctions far beyond the scope of relief contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, functionally inserting themselves into the executive policy making process and therefore undermining the democratic process. . . . This anti-democratic takeover is orchestrated by forum-shopping organizations that repeatedly bring meritless suits . . . . The effective administration of justice in the Federal courts depends on mechanisms that deter frivolous litigation, protect parties from unwarranted costs, and streamline judicial processes. One key mechanism is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) . . . .” President Trump’s memorandum suggests — as many of the COFC decisions reviewed above suggest — that if a bid protest is not frivolous, there is less need for a bond under Rule 65(c).

Since the COFC already has a bonding mechanism in place under Rule 65(c), should GAO institute a similar bonding requirement? Under global standards (such as the OECD-sponsored Methodology for Assessing Procurement Systems (MAPS)), imposing fees or costs on protesters may render a protest system “not effective,” as required by trade agreements and the UN Convention Against Corruption. Imposing a bond requirement (and thus a monetary barrier to protest) in every case in which the procurement is stayed, in other words, could (per these international benchmarks) render the U.S. bid protest regime “ineffective,” or facially delinquent. Cf. European Commission, Remedies Directives (EU directives provide for an automatic ten-day “standstill” period after award of every contract, without bond, to allow bid challenges before the contract is signed).

Consistent Timelines for Protests

Critics have also complained of inconsistent and unpredictable timelines for the resolution of protests, which can lead to unnecessary delays and uncertainty. They have suggested imposing binding deadlines for the filing and resolution of protests. Fixed timelines could be set for agency-level bid protests, probably by an amendment to FAR 33.103, to lend potential protesters confidence that those agency-level protests will be resolved in a timely manner and with a minimum of uncertainty.

“Technical” Protests

Critics have complained that “technical” protests—protests based purely on minor defects in procedure—undermine the FAR’s goals in efficiency, and that therefore Congress should impose heightened standards for pleading and judgments. As noted above, GAO has already imposed a consolidated, arguably tightened standard of review. Studies have shown that GAO typically sustains protests only on serious grounds such as an agency’s misapplication of award criteria, and GAO’s rules make clear that it will recommend relief only after taking into account the recommendation’s practical effect. Like GAO, the COFC will carefully consider the practical impact of its protest decisions—it will not simply sustain “technical” protests.

Enhanced Debriefings

In a debriefing, an agency explains to a vendor why the vendor lost. In the broader debate over bid protest reform, improving debriefings are too often overlooked as an inexpensive means of reducing bid protests. Many practitioners in fact credit the Defense Department’s recently enhanced debriefings with lowering the overall number of bid protests. Once a vendor fully understands why it lost, and how it can do better in the next procurement, the vendor is generally less likely to protest. As experienced bid protest attorneys Nathaniel Castellano and Peter Camp have noted, “the defining feature of an enhanced debriefing is for the agency to provide each disappointed offeror with the actual evaluation materials relevant to evaluation and non-selection of that offeror’s proposal.” That became standard practice for larger Defense Department debriefings after passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, Public Law No. 115-91, which has been implemented through the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Proponents suggest that civilian agencies adopt enhanced debriefing practices as well.

As is discussed below, proposed changes to agency-level bid protests under the Trump administration’s “Revolutionary FAR Overhaul” would afford agency-level protesters access to agency’s redacted source selection decisions.

Improved Agency-Level Protests

Agency-Level Bid Protests

Another point of potential reform is agency-level protests. As an earlier report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (see box at right) noted, agency-level protests – protests brought to the procuring agency itself – are a missed opportunity for federal agencies. Agency-level protests allow the agency to identify and rectify mistakes quickly, to contain risk through a streamlined bid protest procedure that can be quick with little disruption to the procurement process. But agency-level protests have largely failed since they were regularized in 1994, in part because procedures for these bid protests have not been updated. Some best practices in agency-level bid protests which could be applied government-wide:

• Formalize the Role of the “Agency Protest Official”
• Confirm Agencies’ Broad Jurisdiction to Hear Agency-Level Protests
• Clarify Timelines
• Specify Record Necessary for Agency-Level Protest
• Maximize the Record Shared with Protesters
• Enhance the Stay of Performance
• Publish Data on Agency-Level Protests

Notably, the Trump administration’s pending Revolutionary FAR Overhaul (RFO) of FAR Part 33 would implement several of the proposed reforms to bid protests (see RFO practice guide). For example, the RFO changes to FAR 33.104 (agency-level protests) would ensure that agency-level protesters had access to (and could argue from) the agency’s redacted source selection decision. Incremental reforms across Government could make agency-level protests a much more effective tool to ensure fair competition and good management, at very low cost. 

The Percipient.ai Decisions

In a major development for bid protests, on August 28, 2025 the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that standing to protest under the Tucker Act is not to be expanded – that, consistent with longstanding precedent and the Tucker Act’s legislative history, only actual or prospective bidders may protest at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Their ruling put aside a panel decision which would have extended standing to other parties – not just disappointed bidders – when they protested general violations of a procurement statute or regulation under the Tucker Act.

Because of its procedural posture, the facts of the Percipient.ai case were accepted by the appeals court as pleaded by the protester. The court noted that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency had competed and awarded a contract for services to support the agency in gaining visual intelligence data, and to integrate those capabilities with computer vision (CV), a form of artificial intelligence. Percipient did not compete for the prime contract as it was not prepared to meet all the requirements. Instead, once the prime contract was in place, Percipient approached the prime contractor to urge that Percipient be awarded a subcontract to provide its commercial CV solution. But the prime contractor moved to develop its own software solution, and the agency (in Percipient’s view) did not resolve the matter. Percipient therefore brought a bid protest under the Tucker Act, claiming that the agency had not met the requirement of 10 U.S.C. § 3453 (and its implementing regulations) to consider and make maximum use of available commercial solutions.

After the protest was dismissed in 2023 by the Court of Federal Claims, 2023 WL 3563093, the case was appealed to the Federal Circuit. In June 2024, the majority of a divided three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit, 104 F.4^th 839, ruled that:

1. No task order bar: Although the prime contractor was working under a task order, the panel’s decision held that the bar against task order protests under 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(1) did not apply because Percipient was protesting, not the award of a task order, but the agency’s failure to require its prime contractor to research and use commercially available solutions.
2. Subject matter jurisdiction: The panel’s decision said that the case fell within the language of the Tucker Act which (beyond pre- and post-award challenges) allows protests of “alleged violation[s] of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” The panel decision noted that the term “in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement” is “sweeping,” and can be met by any connection with any stage of the federal contracting process. Id. at 851 (citing Distributed Sols., Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008); RAMCOR Servs. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
3. Standing: The panel decision found that Percipient had standing to sue although it was not an actual or prospective bidder, under the same language of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) which states that a bid protest may be brought by an “interested party objecting to . . .  any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement,” since Percipient’s allegations did not “challenge a contract, proposed contract, or solicitation for a contract . . . or the issuance of a task order.”
4. Timeliness of protest: The panel decision held that Percipient’s protest was timely because it was not to the terms of a solicitation, and thus did not need to be brought before bidding had closed on the prime contract per Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

In a vigorous dissent, Judge Clevenger argued that the majority decision was at odds with precedent. The majority erred, he argued, “in significantly narrowing the existing scope of the task order bar in 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(1), by reinterpreting the statute to bar only protests focused on a task order, not protests more broadly made in connection with the issuance of a task order.” Judge Clevenger also argued that the majority erred “in significantly broadening the existing scope of ‘interested party’ statutory standing” under the Tucker Act by “permitting potential subcontractors for the first time to bring suit.” 104 F.4^th at 859.

The full Federal Circuit subsequently granted the government’s request for rehearing en banc and vacated the earlier panel decision, but said that the full court would hear only one question : whether Percipient had standing. 121 F.4th 1311.

In a decision issued on August 28, 2025, 2025 WL 247267, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected Percipient’s argument that standing to protest under the Tucker Act should extend beyond actual or prospective bidders, slip op. at 15:

We have long held that the term “interested party” for bid protests should be limited to actual or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract. In AFGE [American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2001)], we explained that, in enacting ADRA [the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act], “Congress intended to extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to include post-award bid protest cases brought under the APA by disappointed bidders.” 258 F.3d at 1302 (emphasis added). We see no reason to depart from this settled interpretation.

In a strong dissent, four judges of the Federal Circuit argued that to make sense of the language of the Tucker Act, the term “interested party” should not be confined to actual or prospective bidders but should be read to include anyone with a “direct economic interest [that] would be affected by” the alleged violation of law.

It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will agree to hear the matter, so the en banc decision in the Federal Circuit may prove the last in the Percipient.ai line of cases.

ABA Survey

The organizers of the webinar, with support from the American Bar Association (ABA) Public Contract Law Section’s Bid Protest Committee, have surveyed Committee members on agencies’ potentially broader use of extended debriefings, which are currently required for some Defense Department procurements. See DFARS 215.506. Extended debriefings currently call for disclosure of the agency’s written source selection decision document, redacted to protect the confidential and proprietary information of other offerors. The pending survey (the results of which will be discussed during the September 9, 2025 webinar) asked the following:

• Would extended debriefings used across government benefit the agencies, bidders and the public?
• Would extended debriefings reduce some of the risks inherent in “other transactions” contracting?
• Would extended debriefings reduce “second-bite” protests, in which a protester, having protested unsuccessfully at the Government Accountability Office, brings a follow-on protest to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims?
• Would extended debriefings reduce the risk of meritless protests?
• Would extended debriefings make “protest bonds” (security required to compensate the government for possible losses during a mandatory stay of contract performance pending a protest) less necessary?
• Would extended debriefings reduce corruption, competition and reputational risks to the government?
• Would extended debriefings increase future competition by allowing offerors to improve proposals, reduce prices and costs, and offer better technical solutions in the future?

Research Resources

• Percipient.ai, Inc. v. United States: Original decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 104 F.4th 839 (June 7, 2024). The subsequent en banc decision is available here.
• GAO report in response to Section 885 of the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act. American Bar Association submission on Section 885.
• H.R. 3838 – Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026. See Section 818.
• House Subcommittee on Oversight, July 22, 2025 subcommittee hearing (including testimony). C. Yukins’ follow-up responses to questions.
• Revolutionary FAR Overhaul (RFO), including FAR Part 33 (protests).
• Nathaniel Castellano & Peter Camp, Postscript III: Enhanced Debriefings: A Simple Strategy for a More Manageable Protest Process, 35 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 46 (2021).
• Luke Levasseur & Evan Williams, Congressional Bid Protest Concerns Lack Evidence (Law360, Aug. 2025).
• David P.J. Timm (JD, GW Law 2018), GAO Warns Protesters of AI Sanctions (Burr & Forman, Aug. 2025).
• Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Bid Protests in the U.S. Procurement System: Assessing Proposed Reforms — Part I, 67 Gov. Contractor ¶ 216 (Thomson Reuters, Aug. 27, 2025) (overview of reforms under consideration by Congress), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5417195, and Part II, 67 Gov. Contractor ¶ 221 (Thomson Reuters, Sept. 10, 2025) (Percipient.ai, debriefings and agency-level protests), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5476606.

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